The evolution of the family from the medieval Killer Mother-dominated gynarchy to the Punishing Patriarchal-dominated nuclear family took place during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. Because mothers began to abuse their children somewhat less by the sixteenth century, men could grow up less afraid of females, and need not “fear approaching the kitchen full of women,” so fathers stopped living in separate quarters and reduced their having sex with concubines and established for the first time constant patriarchal dominance of wives and children. Paternal love was still missing, but fathers spent much more time with their wives and children, beating and torturing them daily but also eating meals with them and teaching them that fathers are divinely chosen to rule the family and the nation. (The historical connections between paternal dominance and national dominance are detailed by psychohistorian Christian Lackner.)¹

It became an issue in England by the eighteenth century what to call your spouse: the adoption of first names between spouses rather than “Sir” and “Madam” was practiced for the first time. Saying “I love you” was first allowed, and the term “companionate marriage” was introduced as a possibility.⁵⁰ Although upper-class husbands still kept mistresses and lower-class men still visited prostitutes regularly, during the late eighteenth century wives began to be less indifferent to the adulteries of their husbands.⁵¹ Fathers were instructed “not to act in anger” when beating their children and wives, and should precede their blows with a clear explanation of their offence and God’s opposition to their behavior.⁵² Even children of nobility were beaten daily. Louis XIII was “beaten mercilessly on waking in the morning. He was beaten on the buttocks by his nurse with a birch or a switch. His father whipped him himself when in a rage.”⁵³ Children were also regularly beaten by their teachers, since it was believed that “fear is good for putting the child in the mood to hear and to understand. A child cannot quickly forget what he has learned in fear.”⁵⁴ A nineteenth-century teacher described classes of the time: “Whoever taught the children to read would grab their shirts about the shoulders, then hold the book in one hand, the rod in the other, ready to flail away at the slightest oversight.”⁵⁵ British schools were particularly famous for their “erotic flagellation” beatings where “a teacher forces students to unbutton their trousers, push them down, show everything and receive the whip in the middle of the class.”⁵⁶ One German teacher bragged he had given “911,527 strokes with the stick, 124,000 lashes with the whip, and 136,715 slaps with the hand.”⁵⁷

It is not until late in the nineteenth century, with the advent of the socializing mode of childrearing, that Elizabeth Pleck, in her massive study of American family violence, could find a few parents who did not hit their children.⁵⁸ Mothers in nineteenth-century America were urged by John Abbott to “smile, care and reward their children, but when kindness fails, let not the mother hesitate for a moment to punish as severely as is necessary.”⁵⁹ In America and Britain recently, the majority of children are still hit in their early years, with mothers doing the hitting far more often than fathers.⁶⁰ By 1992, over 90 percent of Americans hit their young children, dropping to 57 percent by 1999.⁶¹ Over twenty other nations have recently passed laws outlawing the hitting of children, even by parents.

Family historians carefully record all the daily beatings and tortures, but then conclude like Colin Heywood in his book A History of Childhood: “Historians have come to the conclusion that practices that appear abusive today, such as repeated whippings, were motivate by love.”⁶² Other family historians have simply denied that what they repeatedly discovered was representative. As Alan Valentine concluded after examining 600 years of letters from fathers to sons without finding a single piece of evidence of warmth or empathy: “Doubtless an infinite number of fathers have written to their sons letters that would warm and lift our hearts, if we only could find them. The happiest fathers leave no history…”⁶³

Whippings came, of course, from what parents felt was a moral necessity to form their character, not only from anger: “If the mother could not spare the time to beat her child she could hire a ‘professional flagellant’ who advertised their child-beating services in newspaper ads; or she could hire a ‘guarde-de-ville to whip her three children once a week, naughty or not.’”⁶⁴ It is no surprise that most people agreed that the dominant personality type in early modern times was the depressive, and literature from Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy to Shakespeare’s Hamlet told how “melancholy is the malaise of the age.”⁶⁵

What I call “intrusive mode” parents actually felt closer to their children than previous mode parents. Rather than mostly rejection they convey to their children the message that “You are bad, and I must beat you, but if you admit it and subject your inner life to total control by me I will allow you to feel closer to me.”⁶⁶ In paternal families both wives and children were allowed for the first time to eat at the same table as their fathers, rather than just being made to wait upon them as in earlier periods. Family dinners were occasions for family prayer, where fathers reviewed at length the sins of each of his children.

Fathers routinely beat their wives until well into the twentieth century even in more advanced nations. Jean Bodin spoke of “the husband’s power over the wife as the source and origin of every human society.”⁶⁷ The wives were brought up to expect being beaten without complaining. As the mother in Little Women puts it, “I am angry nearly every day of my life, but I have learned not to show it.” John Wesley told wives they must constantly think “My husband is my superior; he has the right to rule over me. God has given it to him.”⁶⁸ Coontz convincingly shows that only by the late nineteenth century were girls encouraged to marry for intimacy rather than for obedience.⁶⁹ Some girls were given education earlier than this, but not until the late nineteenth century were most females taught to read more than a few psalms and a bit of Holly Scripture.⁷⁰ In fact most females were barred from regular attendance in grammar schools and universities in European nations until well into the nineteenth century.⁷¹ The first public elementary schools in England were in 1833, and only in 1880 was attendance compulsory.⁷² Nineteenth century books for girls taught: “You must submit yourselves to your husbands as unto the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the Church.”⁷³ In schools girls were mainly taught “wife-work”—how to do housekeeping and weaving, how to “keep her place”, and how to avoid making her spouse feel less clever than her.⁷⁴ The father’s main task was to teach his boys that “to become a man, he must shift his attachment away from his mother, and eventually learns to disparage qualities that are feminine.”⁷⁵

THE UBIQUITY OF SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN
When Freud found that so many of his patients reported to him having been sexually abused in childhood—he himself remembered being seduced by his nurse when he was two—he was only rediscovering what was well known although rarely discussed in earlier times. From the widespread paternal incest and pimping of sons of fifteenth century Italy to the excuse given by British abusers in 1900 that “they simply had to have intercourse with little children because that was the only way they could be cured of venereal disease,” the sexual abuse of children was rarely objected to and even more rarely prosecuted.⁷⁶ When Beatrice Webb wrote that sexual abuse of young girls by their fathers and brothers was so common that British girls often joked with each other about their babies being products of incest, they were confirming what most knew: that paternal incest was quite common well into the nineteenth century.⁷⁷ Even when a British study in 1991 found 45 percent of girls and 30 percent of boys admitting to remembering having been sexually abused as children (the actual rates being much higher due to underreporting and repression), British doctors surveyed at that time said they thought the sexual abuse rate was probably “less than one percent.”⁷⁸ Similarly, U.S. rates derived from Russell’s careful interviews, when corrected for underreporting, was 40 percent for girls and 30 percent for boys, almost half directly incestuous for girls and about a quarter incestuous for boys.⁷⁹ About half of the perpetrators lived under the same roof as their victims as fathers, uncles, brothers and stepfathers, with about half of the assaults being perpetuated on children under 7. Sexual abuse of little children is still routine in the rest of the world, starting with Asian maternal masturbation of little children from India to Japan.⁸⁰ The diary of Louis XIII’s pediatrician makes it clear that, as Philippe Aries puts it, “the practice of playing with children’s privy parts formed part of a widespread tradition.”⁸¹ Aries, of course, like most historians, called the routine sexual use of little Louis “only a game whose scabrous nature we should beware of exaggerating.”⁸²

Family beds were the usual practice everywhere in the world until well into the nineteenth century, so children were always in some measure part of parental intercourse. When in 1908 incest was finally made a criminal offense in England, it was considered a minor felony, rarely prosecuted.⁸³ In addition, the widespread practice of parents choosing the spouses of their little girls was in fact a very popular form of sexual abuse, since forcing them to marry a stranger at ages 10-12 was actually rape (most U.S. states until the end of the nineteenth century set the age of legal marriage at 10-12.)⁸⁴ Fathers in the past were the main perpetrators of rape. The figure given by Debbie Taylor that today over 100 million young girls are “being raped by adult men—usually their fathers—often day after day, year in, year out”⁸⁵ is staggering, but is dwarfed by the billions of children raped and otherwise sexually molested around the world over the past few centuries.

The sexual abuse of children is less motivated by erotic desires than by the need to assault, to hurt, to dominate. For instance, gang rapes of girls were commonly considered “public performances,” and thought by others to be “harmless initiation rites.”⁸⁶ Parents freely allowed and even encouraged servants, nursemaids, nannies and teachers to use their children sexually. Louis XIII’s entire court would sometimes line up at his bed and “kiss his cock.”⁸⁷ The King and Queen and their servants would undress him and his sister and bring them naked in bed for sexual games, so that Louis could accurately report, “Mercier has a cunt as big as that,” showing his two fists, saying “there’s a lot of water inside.“⁸⁸ Many schools allowed the rape of boys, as in British public schools into the nineteenth century where “the rape of boys with the full knowledge and collusion, even the approval, of their elders…where older boys and even teachers had younger boys as their ‘bitches’ to use sexually.”⁸⁹ Most of child raping was done with the collusion of parents: mothers rented out rooms to boarders and offered their daughters to sleep with them, children were loaned to overnight guests as an act of hospitality, children in London were sent out by the thousands by their mothers onto the streets as prostitutes, and children as young as six were openly offered for sale and sexual use by public advertisements in most cities of Europe.”⁹⁰ Doctors well into the nineteenth century thought having sexual intercourse with three-year-old girls was a good idea because it was “instructive to familiarize them with carnal matters…”⁹¹ As Anna Clark puts it, “men seemed to regard rape as a trivial issue.”⁹² Even twentieth-century sexologists considered pederasty positively: “There is no shame in being a pederast or a rapist if one is satisfied” (Edwards and Masters); “It is difficult to understand why a child should be disturbed at having its genitalia touched” (Kinsey); “incest can be a satisfying and enriching experience.” (Pomeroy)⁹³

Physicians were long familiar with young children with venereal diseases. “Most resisted making any explicit connection between venereal diseases in children and sexual contact with adults, even when the disease existed in the immediate family.”⁹⁴ Not until psychohistorian Karen Taylor analyzed hundreds of the medical journals of nineteenth-century physicians and showed that even though the physicians assumed innocent causes for the children’s venereal diseases there had to be intimate direct sexual contact with the diseased genital area of the adult (usually the father), so that she strongly concluded that the children with venereal disease were in fact “victims of sexual abuse.”⁹⁵ The belief that “one could cure venereal disease” by means of sexual intercourse with children”⁹⁶ was of course one of the main underlying motivations for the frequency of paternal abuse, in addition to the need of fathers to prove their masculinity.

ADVANCING FROM MONARCHICAL STATES TO DEMOCRATIC NATIONS
The monarchies of the sixteenth century consciously repeated the husband’s domination of the paternal family; as King James put it in 1603, “I am the husband and the whole island is my lawful wife.”⁹⁷ As the brutal “intrusive mode” bond between father and child was established, “the authoritarian family and the authoritarian nation-state were the solutions to an intolerable sense of anxiety and a deep yearning for order.”⁹⁸ The State and the King, like the Father, “could do no wrong,” and state sovereigns could summon standing armies and levy permanent taxes, unlike earlier regents who had to “go begging from town to town to obtain local grants.”⁹⁹ Before states could supplant local lords and create nations they had to “develop governments that have monopolies over the legitimate use of physical force throughout the country…to keep order, to build roads, to deliver basic services.”¹⁰⁰ Nations are termed “imagined communities” by Benedict Anderson,¹⁰¹ emphasizing that they are not ethnic groups or single-language communities. All these advances were made possible by an increase in trust within the family, extended to the nation.

Even when Kings shared power with a parliament, as in England, “the king’s prerogative was indisputable in matters involving war and peace.”¹⁰² Kings were said to have two bodies, “like the two sexes of a hermaphrodite,” combining the domination alters in the brains of their subjects of both mother and father. Soldiers are told by kings to “fight for la patria [feminine noun] and suffer even death for her.”¹⁰³ Where there were early royal parliaments, they addressed their humble petitions to the king, but he would then end the matter by saying yes or no. Monarchs were free to inflict their grandiosity upon both subjects and enemies, experiencing a dopamine high and claiming they had to “cleanse them of their evils” as their parents cleansed them of evil. Homicide rates plunged when modern states began imposing their police power, but deaths by the state nevertheless increased dramatically as wars became far more deadly, with massive conscripted armies replacing hired mercenaries and gunpowder replacing swords.¹⁰⁴

Memories of maternal infanticide nevertheless remained and were re-experienced during periodic witchcraft epidemics, where women were regularly addressed as “Monstrous Mothers”¹⁰⁵ and young girls had “convulsive fits” in courts “as the Devil entered them”¹⁰⁶ while they switched into their memories of their mothers’ beatings as “ghosts from the nursery.” Witches were accused of doing the things mothers actually did: “witches suffocate very small children or kill them by thrusting a needle behind their ear or they snatch children from the cradle and rend them in pieces.”¹⁰⁷ Sometimes entire villages would go into alter trances together, as when the Benandanti fantasied as they slept they fought “night battles” against witches.¹⁰⁸

It was the developmental new strengths of the intrusive childrearing mode, not changes in “culture,” that produced the dramatic historical innovations of the Reformation, humanism and industrialism. For instance, what allowed James Watt to invent the modern steam engine was his parents’ teaching him to read and allowing him to endlessly experiment with the steam kettle for hours every day in his family kitchen, changing the world by his curiousity.¹⁰⁹ Initially, of course, modern social relationships carried out the paternal authoritarianism of the family. If childrearing had been better, early voters would have dominated kings and early workers would have been given corporate board seats along with investors. But modern states were established under patriarchal domination principles, and industrialization gains in gross national product were constantly offset by increasingly destructive wars, as every strengthening of the fantasy of in-groups was matched by a strengthening of the fantasy of dangerous out-groups. Between 1530 and 1710 there was a ten-fold increase in the total numbers of armed forces involved in major European battles.¹¹⁰ As the interstate system expands in the modern period, strong states tend to fight the strong and the weak tend to fight the weak…the stronger two states are, the greater the likelihood of a fight between them.¹¹¹ The common theory of historians that “territory is the most important single cause of war between states”¹¹² is meaningless—it is like saying “schoolyard bullies usually hit those nearest to them” but never asking why they need to hit. What is more accurate is their finding that “fighting is more prevalent during periods of prosperity rather than periods of stagnation or depression,”¹¹³ which backs up my theory that wars are motivated by “growth panic” progress that triggers the re-enacting of childhood violence. In fact, no great-power wars have started during a depression in the past two centuries.¹¹⁴ Modelski traces the cycles of war to clusters of innovations introduced into the world, and shows how Portugal was the first pioneer of discoveries, how Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution, and how both were very war prone during their most Progressive periods.¹¹⁵ When outside enemies cannot be found to start wars with, inside groups are imagined as dangerous. In democratizing Rwanda, Hutus and Tutsis were “neighbors, schoolmates, friends, even in-laws” indistinguishable from each other, but when splitting time came because of growth panic and they slaughtered over a million of their neighbors they could only say as a reason that they did it “because their noses were longer” or “they were cockroaches” or “God said he no longer wanted them.”¹¹⁶ Their war trance made them completely dissociated. After they chopped off the arms and heads of their friends they said, “I had been living with these people all these years. I wasn’t afraid of them. They weren’t a threat to me. But we were told they were enemies and I believed it.”¹¹⁷

Just as interesting is the finding that the usual methods of dealing with interstate threats—the making of alliances and the buildup of your military—are actually just provocative results of national grandiosity and lead to wars.¹¹⁸ The need for nations to “demonstrate our resolve” by military buildups is simply a restaging of parental “demonstrations of resolve” to use violence against their children, as nations fuse with the punishing parental alters embedded in their amygdalan fear centers. Only the emotional state of grandiosity experienced by states going into their war trances (caused by the release of dopamine and brain opiates) makes them feel invulnerable. Usually the periods before wars include wild apocalyptic group-fantasy trance episodes, like the Great Awakenings in America in 1858, when “daily gatherings of thousands of people in spontaneous prayer meetings took place, where people fell down, saw visions, and went out and destroyed their goods in preparation for the end of the world” as they “felt God-like” and were “cleansed in the fires of war.”¹¹⁹ In fact, the states that have the least need to go to war are the most likely to start them: “The strongest states are the most war-prone and the most likely to initiate wars.”¹²⁰ The average modern nation is at war 20 percent of the time during the nineteenth century compared to pre-state societies which were almost continuously at war.¹²¹ In my previous book, The Emotional Life of Nations, I presented extensive evidence showing how modern nations regularly go to war four times a century, repeating four national group-fantasy phases: (1) innovative phase, (2) depressed phase, (3) manic phase and (4) war phase.¹²² The second phase, that of Depressions, takes place periodically between wars, as nations become grandiose and engage in more and more self-destructive risky ventures, convinced each time that “This time is different.”¹²³

Modern nationalism became a religion to replace Christianity, with the French Assembly setting up actual altars to the nation like church altars, with the inscription: “The citizen is born, lives, and dies for la patrie.“¹²⁴ The national flag and the national anthem became sacred replacements for the cross and for church hymns.¹²⁵ Schools began to teach patriotism to the nation rather than devotion to the Lord. And new national leaders found that they could more easily increase their popularity by provoking a war than by achieving spiritual or economic gains.

NATIONS SPLIT INTO PARTIES BY CHILDREARING PSYCHOCLASS
Because nations contain some adults that are advanced childrearing modes and others that fall behind and have more abusive childhoods, they split into Progressive and Reactionary political parties. While Progressives invent more empathic, secure economic and political relationships, Reactionaries have been shown to have greater death anxieties, entertain more authoritarian, more apocalyptic group-fantasies, see others as sinful and needing punishment, need more military solutions to problems, and are more misogynistic toward females.¹²⁶ The party that speaks with the voice of the punishing parent is termed “Reactionary” because their central focus is to react against Progressives, accusing them of being “too liberal” and “not tough enough.” Reactionary psychoclasses have their mirror neuron networks damaged during childhoods and lack empathy toward others. Careful studies reveal they have three times as many nightmares, fear death more and support wars far more.¹²⁷ The group-fantasy cycles described above are periodic phases of domination of national mood first by Progressive and then by Reactionary psychoclasses, with growth of industrialization, civil rights movements, woman’s suffrage movements, peace movements and other Progressive movements being opposed by the majority of the Reactionary populace.

Historians usually overlook the childrearing of Progressive and Reactionary leaders, but it isn’t difficult to trace the origin of their political policies back to their parenting experiences. In America’s last election, for instance, Progressive Barrack Obama often reported details of the love and affection of his mother and grandmother during his early years, saying “the best thing my mom taught me was empathy: making sure that you can see the world through somebody else’s eyes.”¹²⁸ In stark contrast, Reactionary John McCain described his parents as beating him so hard that he often passed out as he held his breath during the beatings. He reports they punished him for holding his breath and passing out by filling the bathtub with ice cold water and throwing him in while unconscious, fully clothed.¹²⁹ He says “this went on for some time until I was finally ‘cured.’ Whenever I worked myself into a tiny rage, my mother shouted to my father, ‘Get the water!’ Moments later I would find myself thrashing, wide-eyed and gasping for breath, in a tub of icy-cold water.”¹³⁰ He considers this made a man of him, and it was obviously the model for him choosing to remain in North Vietnam as a prisoner and be tortured.

The “two bodies,” male and female, of the state’s Monarch become split into the two bodies of the nation. The male is the President, and he is the Punishing Father who enforces the rules, and his home in Washington has his phallic columns. The female is the Legislature, it has the only power to go to war, and its home is the Capitol Rotunda, an obviously full maternal breast, complete with erect nipple on top, and with a statue of the war goddess Freedom on the very top, holding her war sword and her victory wreath. If Presidents don’t take nations to war when the people and Congress ask him to, he is shot—as John F. Kennedy was shot after so many people were furious with him for not giving the U.S. the war it was expecting in Cuba, and after he was so aware of Dallas citizens wanting his death that he made a home movie just before going there, “just for fun,” of himself being assassinated.¹³¹ Reactionaries don’t just oppose Progressives; they demonize them, as “weak”, “appeasers”, and “grovelers in chief,” as Obama was recently called.¹³² The grandiosity that precedes wars is experienced as a moral crusade against the vile sinfulness of too-liberal insider groups; as Koonz put it in her book The Nazi Conscience: “The road to Auschwitz was paved with righteousness,”¹³³ the righteousness of the Punishing Parents embedded in their amygdalas.

DEMOCRACIES AND WAR
Midlarsky’s lifelong studies of war show that “A joint democracy is sufficient to ensure peace between pairs of states; there are no exceptions to that rule.”¹³⁴ But democratizing nations go to war more often even than authoritarian dictatorships—from 4 to 15 times as often as non-democratizing states¹³⁵—since they experience far more “growth panic” as they work off the fears of their growth panic on enemies: “The most war-prone states are those at the beginning stages of democratization.”¹³⁶ “Democratizing states have been more likely to be the attacker than the target of aggression in these wars.”¹³⁷ Countries do not become mature democracies overnight:

Although “virtually every great power has gone on the warpath during the initial phase of its entry into democracy,” fully liberal democratic nations never have started wars with other democratic nations,¹³⁹ since to become a fully liberal democratic nation the bulk of the families must have made the transition into the socializing mode of childrearing, with most families having evolved beyond infanticide, swaddling, wetnursing, and beating. The majority of even democratic nations’ families still dominate and hit their children, of course, so democratic nations continue to go to war as often as other countries, but choose non-democracies as their enemies (particularly ones that can be made into colonies) winning most of the wars they start.¹⁴⁰ Statistical analyses of wars reveal “despite the fact that mature democracies do not fight each other, democracies are about as likely to fight wars as non-democracies.¹⁴¹ Most wars after democratization are wars of “ethnic cleansing,” like the long war that killed over ten million American Indians that Jefferson called “justified extermination.”¹⁴² As Mann puts it, “Murderous cleansing is modern, because it is the dark side of democracy.”¹⁴³ As both fathers and mothers raise their children, before they are toilet trained they regularly call them “dirty,” and the cleansing of ethnic groups becomes one of the main tasks of civil wars as they fuse with their “cleansing” parents and punish their Bad Selves.

DEMOCRATIZATION REQUIRES CLEANSING TERROR AND WAR
As French families improved in the 17th and 18th centuries, as infanticide declined, as women were allowed to choose who they married, as children began to go to school, as husbands began to beat their wives less, childrearing moved into the socializing mode with its quest for the real self through individuation, and nations began to ask for democratic freedoms.¹⁴⁴ Real love entered the family. As Badinter summarizes her findings: “By the nineteenth century the marriage of convenience had given way to the marriage based on love” for many French families.¹⁴⁵ Rather than spending their adult lives chasing their “ghosts from the nursery,” men began to trust others and create the Industrial Revolution. The chart above shows how income per person had been unchanged for centuries, but in the 19th century prosperity literally turned straight up, creating progress in every walk of life. Since historians generally ignore changes in childrearing, they are totally bewildered as to why this took place at this particular time, before democratic freedoms, saying things like “No one planned Progress as a whole. It simply erupted.”¹⁴⁶

As everyone began to experience more freedoms, the nation began to be represented as a goddess, Marienne, la nation, and republicans were said to “live only for the mother country, as soon as he has no more mother country, he is no longer.”¹⁴⁷ This fusion with the Motherland, patriotism, made all progress and all individual freedoms terribly frightening, and was experienced as growth panic. Mommy hated my freedom. Mommy had told me she was the boss, that I was only interested in my needs, not hers. From the very beginning, the French Revolution imagined angry, dangerous women populating the nation, as when Marie-Antoinette, a rather sweet-natured young woman, was deemed “a vampire who sucks the blood of the French” so they had to chop off her head. The Terror of the Revolution not only had no rational purpose, it was accomplished by putting the guillotines in front of statues of Marienne on her maternal throne holding the club with which mothers usually hit their children. As revolutionaries chopped off heads they paraded them on pikes that again represented the mother’s beating sticks. Men began to deny all the rights of women that had begun materializing. The Convention outlawed all women’s associations and began to guillotine all women who asked for voting rights. “The nation as mother, La Nation, had no feminine qualities; it was not a threatening feminizing force [it was] a masculine mother, a father capable of giving birth.”¹⁴⁸

Democratization for every nation involves revolutionary violence and war. As the new freedoms of the Revolution began to be acted upon in the Assembly, in-group and out-group splitting began, with gratuitous accusations by Girondins and Jacobins that the other side was full of “traitors who were about to restore the monarchy.”¹⁴⁹ Both Revolutionary violence and foreign wars were precipitated by this splitting into in-groups and out-groups. The goal was solely slaughter: “The guillotine is hungry,” said a member of the Assembly, “It’s ages since she had something to eat.”¹⁵⁰ Madame Roland described the Revolutionary killing expeditions: “Women brutally raped before being torn to pieces, guts cut out and worn as ribbons, human flesh eaten dripping with blood.”¹⁵¹ The same splitting created France’s external enemies, as their serotonin levels plunged and their mirror neurons turned off so that empathy disappeared.¹⁵² Frenchmen became clinically paranoid toward neighboring nations, turning down any attempts to appease them, and instead imagined that foreigners “might invade in order to destroy the Revolution.”¹⁵³ By the time Napoleon came to power and made war routine, France was already weary from a decade of wars, which used nationalist appeals to foster loyalty but whose causes were in fact solely internal and self-destructive. Historians agree that “there was no question of any threat from the outside.”¹⁵⁴ When Brissot declared that he “cannot be at ease until Europe, and all of Europe, is in flames,”¹⁵⁵ he spoke for citizens needing to become martyrs in order to punish their inner Bad Selves. The ideal of “sacrifice for the nation” became the central focus of French wars. As Michelet said, “Sacrifice for the nation is our political ideal.”¹⁵⁶ “Not one Paris newspaper voiced opposition to the escalation of war fever in January 1792. Not one Paris newspaper objected when Napoleon declared war on Austria in April 1892.¹⁵⁷ Napoleon himself was all his life depressed and suicidal, writing in his diary entries like this: “Life is a burden to me because I taste no pleasure and all is pain…Since die I must, is it not just as well to kill myself?”¹⁵⁸

The actual words that the French used as they went to war were those their Angry Mother had used as she had to clean them of their urine and feces: war was necessary “to cleanse the soil of liberty of this refuse…They should be given strong republican medicine: a purge, a vomit and an enema.”¹⁵⁹ French soldiers “routinely raped and mutilated women and children…forcing them to kneel in front of a large pit they had dug; they were then shot so as to tumble into their own grave”¹⁶⁰ as a preliminary to the Nazi Holocaust. Napoleon, like Hitler, aimed only at mass extermination, humiliating and provoking one nation after another into battle and telling Metternich that “a man like me does not give a shit about the lives of a million men.”¹⁶¹

Napoleon’s 12 years of wars with a series of coalitions of European states so overextended French armies that when they invaded Russia they were finally defeated at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. Suicidal French wars were over for a while. Napoleon himself tried to commit suicide again after Waterloo by poisoning himself. Counting both military and civilian deaths, over two million of Europeans in fact were victims of the suicidal growth panic of democratization.¹⁶² After the French Revolution, nation after nation democratized around the world, each time producing the sacrificial growth panic of internal Terror and external war. The past two centuries have been filled with hundreds of totally unnecessary, suicidal civil and external wars by democratizing nations around the world by hundreds of leaders who repeated Napoleon’s dicta that “Troops are made to get killed.”¹⁶³ In the next chapter, we will examine the global wars of the twentieth century and reveal how each of them was triggered by the growth panic of democratization, by national grandiosity and by the self-destructive internal alters that forced citizens to re-enact their abusive childhoods.

FOOTNOTES:

¹ Christian Lackner, “Europe: Hierarchical Super State or Participative Network.” The Journal of Psychohistory 37(2010): forthcoming.

² Lloyd deMause, Foundations of Psychohistory. New York: Creative Roots, 1982, pp. 26-34, 117-123.

³ Ibid, p. 33.

⁴ Bogna W. Lorence, “Parents and Children I Eighteenth-Century Europe.” History of Childhood Quarterly: The Journal of Psychohistory 2(1974): 11.

⁵ Volker Hunecke, “Children in Nineteenth-Century Milan and the European Context.” In John Henderson, Ed. Poor Women and Children in the European Past. New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 125.

⁶ S. Ryan Johansson, “Centuries of Childhood/ Centuries of Parenting.” Journal of Family History 12(1987): 358.

⁷ Lloyd deMause, The Emotional Life of Nations. New York: Karnac Publishing, 2002, p. 304.

⁸ Ibid., p. 305.

⁹ Daniel Beekman, The Mechanical Baby: A Popular History of the Theory and Practice of Child Raising. Westport: Lawrence Hill, 1977, p. 47.

¹⁰ Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1986, p. 259.

¹¹ Peter N. Stearns, Childhood in World History. New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 60.

¹² Louis Adamic, Cradle of Life: The Story of One Man’s Beginnings. New York: Harper, 1936, pp. 45, 48.

¹³ Lloyd deMause, The Emotional Life of Nations, pp. 319-320; Elisabeth Badinter, Mother Love: Myth and Reality—Motherhood in Modern History. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 2981, pp. x, 94.

¹⁴ Steven Ozment, When Fathers Ruled: Family Life in Reformation Europe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 118.

¹⁵ Elisabeth Badinter, Mother Love, p. x.

¹⁶ www.faqs.org/childhood/Th-W/Wet-nursing.html

¹⁷ George Anne Bellamy, An Apology for the Life of George Anne Bellamy. London: London Press, 1785, p. 26.

¹⁸ Edmund Leites, The Puritan Conscience and Modern Sexuality. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986, p. 45; Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks, Women and Gender in Early Modern Europe: Third Ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 3.

¹⁹ William Kessen, “Rousseau’s Children.” Daedalus 107(1978): 155.

²⁰ Lloyd deMause, The Emotional Life of Nations, pp. 346-7.

²¹ Bogna W. Lorence, “Parents and Children in Eighteenth-Century Europe.” History of Childhood Quarterly: The Journal of Psychohistory 2(1974): 6.

²² Hippolyte Taine, The Ancient Regime. New York: Peter Smith, 1931, p. 136.

²³ Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, a History: From Obedience to Intimacy: How Love Conquered Marriage. New York: Viking, 2005, p. 171.

²⁴ Marylynn Salmon, “The Cultural Significance of Breast-Feeding and Infant Care in Early Modern England and America.” In Rima D. Apple, Ed., Mothers & Motherhood: Readings in American History. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1997, p. 15.

²⁵ Lloyd deMause, Foundations of Psychohistory, p. 110.

²⁶ Lloyd deMause, “The Evolution of Childrearing.” The Journal of Psychohistory 28 (2001): 403.

²⁷ Elisabeth Badinter, Mother Love, p. 173.

²⁸ Hippolyte Taine, The Ancient Regime, p. 136.

²⁹ Bogna W. Lorence, “Parents and Children in Eighteenth-Century Europe.” History of Childhood Quarterly: The Journal of Psychohistory 2(1974): 1.

³⁰ Lloyd deMause, The Emotional Life of Nations, p. 329; Dan Dervin, “Childrearing in Central and Eastern Europe.” The Journal of Psychohistory 35(2008): 225; Daniel Rancour-Laferriere, “Russians React to the Idea of Russian Masochism.” The Journal of Psychohistory 27(1999): 63; Olga Shutova, “Post-Soviet Belarus: Childhood, Family and Identity.” The Journal of Psychohistory 27(1999): 11.

³¹ Gerald Strauss, Luther’s House of Learning: Introduction of the Young in the German Reformation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, p. 97.

³² Elisabeth Badinter, Mother Love, pp. 117, 172; Edward Shorter, The Making of the Modern Family. New York: Basic Books, 1977, p. 197-198.

³³ Elisabeth Badinter, Mother Love, p. 172.

³⁴ Lois L. Huneycutt, “Public Lives, Private Ties: Royal Mothers in England and Scotland, 1070-1204.” In John Carmi Parsons, Ed., Medieval Mothering. New York: Garland Publishing, 1996, p. 296.

³⁵ Edward Shorter, The Making of the Modern Family. New York: Basic Books, 1977, p. 56.

³⁶ Albertine Adrienne Necker, Progressive Education, Commencing with the Infant. Boston: W. D. Ticknor, 1835, p. 180.

³⁷ CNN, Feb. 10, 2010.

³⁸ Stephen M. Frank, Life With Father: Parenthood and Masculinity in the Nineteenth-Century American North. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998, p. 37.

³⁹ Michael Kimmel, Manhood in America: A Cultural History. New York: The Free Press, 1996.

⁴⁰ Galph Greenson, “Why Men Like War.” In R. Nemiroff et al., Eds., On Loving, Hating and Living Well. New York: International Universities Press, 1992, p. 127.

⁴¹ Murry A. Straus, Richard J. Gelles, Suzanne K. Steinmetz, Behind Closed Doors: Violence in the American Family. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006, p. 51.

⁴² Jeremy Rifkin, The Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in a World in Crisis. New York: Penguin Group, 2010, p. 285.

⁴³ Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, A History, p. 173.

⁴⁴ Murray A. Straus, Beating the Devil Out of Them: Corporal Punishment in American Families. New York: Lexington Books, 1991, p. x.

⁴⁵ Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage: In England 1500-1800. Abridged Ed., London: Penguin Books, 1979, p. 293; Lloyd deMause, “The Evolution of Childrearing,” p. 413; Lloyd deMause, The Emotional Life of Nations, p. 340.

⁴⁶ Barbara Kay Greenleaf, Children Through the Ages: A History of Childhood. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1978, p. 90.

⁴⁷ Derek Wilson, Out of the Storm: The Life and Legacy of Martin Luther. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2007, p. 3

⁴⁸ Morton M. Hunt, The Natural History of Love. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1959, p. 224.

⁴⁹ Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, A History, p. 152.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 220-223.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 329.

⁵² Anthony Fletcher, “Prescription and Practice: Protestantism and the Upbringing of Children (1560-1700), In Diana Wood, Ed., The Church and Childhood. London: Blackwell Publishers, 1994, p. 329.

⁵³ Shari L. Thurer, The Myths of Motherhood: How Culture Reinvents the Good Mother. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1994, p. 104.

⁵⁴ James A. Schultz, The Knowledge of Childhood in the German Middle Ages, 1100-1350. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995, p. 94.

⁵⁵ Jeremy Rifkin, The Empathic Civilization, p. 352.

⁵⁶ Jonathan Benthall, “Invisible Wounds: Corporal Punishment in British Schools as a Form of Ritual.” Child Abuse and Neglect 15(1991): 37-388.

⁵⁷ Preserved Smith, A History of Modern Culture, Vol. 2. New York: Henry Holt, 1934, p. 423.

⁵⁸ Elizabeth Pleck, Domestic Tyranny: The Making of Social Policy Against Family Violence from Colonial Times to the Present. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 46.

⁵⁹ Philip Greven, The Protestant Temperament: Patterns of Child-Rearing, Religious Experience, and the Self in Early America. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977, p. 53.

⁶⁰ Lloyd deMause, “What the British Can Do To End Child Abuse.” The Journal of Psychohistory 34(2006): 5-6.

⁶¹ Tracy L. Dietz, “Disciplining Children: Characteristics Associated With the Use of Corporal Punishment.” Child Abuse & Neglect 24(2000): 1529, 1536.

⁶² Colin Heywood, A History of Childhood: Children and Childhood in the West from Medieval to Modern Times. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, p. 117.

⁶³ Alan Valentine, Ed. Fathers to Sons: Advice Without Consent. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963, p. xxx.

⁶⁴ John Hersey, Advice to Christian Parents. Baltimore: Armstrong & Berry, 1839, p. 83.

⁶⁵ Lloyd deMause, The Emotional Life of Nations, p. 419-421.

⁶⁶ Lloyd deMause, Foundations of Psychohistory, p. 110.

⁶⁷ Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Republic, translated in Christine Faure, Ed., Democracy Without Women: Feminism and the Rise of Liberal Individualism in France. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991, p. 40.

⁶⁸ Philip Greven, The Protestant Temperament, p. 127.

⁶⁹ Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, A History, p. 146.

⁷⁰ Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks, Women and Gender in Early Modern Europe, p. 145.

⁷¹ Rosalind Miles, Who Cooked the Last Supper? The Women’s History of the World. New York: Three Rivers Press, 1988, p. 144.

⁷² Hugh Cunningham, Children and Childhood in Western Society since 1500, London: Longman, 1995, p. 157.

⁷³ Glen Davis, Childhood and History in America. New York: The Psychohistory Press, 1976, p. 54.

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 142-143.

⁷⁵ Anne Campbell, Men, Women and Aggression. New York: Basic Books, 1991, p. 26.

⁷⁶ Michael Rocke, Forbidden Friendships: Homosexuality and Male Culture in Renaissance Florence. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996; Jerrold Atlas, “Pederasty, Blood Shedding and Blood Smearing: Men in Search of Mommy’s Feared Powers.” The Journal of Psychohistory 28(2000): 129; Albert Moll, The Sexual Life of the Child. London: Allen & Unwin, 1923, p.219.

⁷⁷ Beatrice Webb, My Apprenticeship. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1926, p. 321.

⁷⁸ Lloyd deMause, “What the British Can Do To End Child Abuse.” The Journal of Psychohistory 34(2006): 4.

⁷⁹ Lloyd deMause, “The Universality of Incest.” The Journal of Psychohistory 19(1991): 134-8.

⁸⁰ Ibid. pp. 142-157.

⁸¹ Philippe Aries, Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life. London: Jonathan Cape, 1962, p. 64.

⁸² Ibid., p. 101.

⁸³ Lloyd deMause, The Emotional Life of Nations, p. 358; Kenneth Alan Adams, “The Familial Origins of Japanese Child Abuse.” The Journal of Psychohistory 33(2005):157-196.

⁸⁴ Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, a History, p. 172.

⁸⁵ Naomi Wolf, The Beauty Myth. New York: Harper Perennial, 1991, p. 161.

⁸⁶ Jacques Rosslaud, “Prostitution, Youth and Society in the Towns of Southeastern France in the Fifteenth Century.” In Robert Forster and Orest Ranum, Eds., Deviants and the Abandoned in French Society. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978, p. 6.

⁸⁷ Elizabeth W. Marvick, “Childhood History and the Decisions of State: The Case of Louis XIII.” History of Childhood Quarterly: The Journal of Psychohistory 2(1974): 150.

⁸⁸ Philippe Aries, Centuries of Childhood, pp. 163, 167.

⁸⁹ Lloyd deMause, The Emotional Life of Nations, p. 378.

⁹⁰ Lloyd deMause, “The Evolution of Childrearing,” p. 441.

⁹¹ A Woman Physician and Surgeon, Unmasked, or, The Science of Immorality. Philadelphia: William H. Boyd, 1878, p. 88.

⁹² Anna Clark, Women’s Silence, Men’s Violence: Sexual Assault in England, 1770-1845. London: Pandora Press, 1987, p. 44.

⁹³ Lloyd deMause, “The Universality of Incest.” The Journal of Psychohistory 19(1981): 131-2.

⁹⁴ Pamela Paradis Tice et al, “Victorian Children and Sex: The Reality Ignored by Proponents of Child Sexual Rights.” The Journal of Psychohistory 30(2003): 400.

⁹⁵ Karen J. Taylor, “Venereal Disease in Nineteenth-Century Children.” The Journal of Psychohistory 12(1985):431-463.

⁹⁶ Lloyd deMause, Foundations of Psychohistory, p. 58.

⁹⁷ Norman Brown, Love’s Body. New York: Random House, 1966, p. 132.

⁹⁸ Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England: 150-1800. London: Harper & Row, 1977, p. 146.

⁹⁹ Bertrand de Jouvenel, Sovereignty: An Inquiry Into the Political Good. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1957, p. 213.

¹⁰⁰ Sheri Berman, “From the Sun King to Karzai.” Foreign Affairs 89(2010): 3.

¹⁰¹ Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin an Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983.

¹⁰² Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule. Berkeley: University of California Press,1978, p. 2.

¹⁰³ Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 11.

¹⁰⁴ Michael E. McCullough, Beyond Revenge: The Evolution of the Forgiveness Instinct. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2008, p. 29.

¹⁰⁵ Deborah Willis, Malevolent Nurture: Witch-Hunting and Maternal Power in Early Modern England. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995, p. 201.

¹⁰⁶ John Putnam Demos, Entertaining Satan: Witchcraft and the Culture of Early New England. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 101.

¹⁰⁷ Lyndal Roper, Witch Craze: Terror and Fantasy in Baroque Germany. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004, p. 9.

¹⁰⁸ Carlo Ginzburg, The Night Battles: Witchcraft & Agrarian Cults in the Sixteenth & Seventeenth Centuries. New York: Penguin Books, 1985, p. 13.

¹⁰⁹ Frank P. Bachman, Great Inventors and Their Inventions. New York: American Book Co., 1918, p. 1.

¹¹⁰ Azar Gat, War in Human Civilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1006, p. 457.

¹¹¹ John A. Vasquez, What Do We Know About War? London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, p. 25.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 58.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 30.

¹¹⁴ Raimo Vayrynen, “Economic Fluctuations, Military Expenditures and Warfare in International Relations.” In Robert K. Schaeffer, Ed., War in the World-System. New York: Greenwood Press, 1989, p. 121.

¹¹⁵ George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987, pp. 48, 71, 86.

¹¹⁶ Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998, pp. 28, 32; Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide. London: Verso, 2004.

¹¹⁷ Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 466.

¹¹⁸ Raimo Vayryen, “Economic Fluctuations,” p. 167.

¹¹⁹ Lloyd deMause, The Emotional Life of Nations, p. 174.

¹²⁰ John A. Vasquez, What Do We Know About War?, p. 357.

¹²¹ Lawrence H. Keeley, War Before Civilization. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 33.

¹²² Lloyd deMause, The Emotional Life of Nations, pp. 158-181.

¹²³ Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.

¹²⁴ Carlton J. H. Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion. New York: Macmillan, 1960, p. 54.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 167.

¹²⁶ Michael A. Milburn and S. D. Conrad, “The Politics of Denial.” The Journal of Psychohistory 23(1996): 244-245; Drew Westen, The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding The Fate of the Nation. New York: Public Affairs, 2007; Patrick Allitt, The Conservatives: Ideas and Personalities Throughout American History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.

¹²⁷ Editorial, In These Times, October 13, 2003, p. 9.

¹²⁸ George Lakoff, The Political Mind: A Cognitive Scientist’s Guide to Your Brain and Its Politics. New York: Penguin Books, 2009, p. xiv; Nikki Grimes, Barack Obama: Son of Promise, Child of Hope. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008.

¹²⁹ John McCain, Faith of My Fathers: A Family Memoir. New York: Harper, 2008, p. 99.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 100.

¹³¹ Lloyd deMause, The Emotional Life of Nations, pp. 6-8.

¹³² Charles A. Kupchan, “Enemies Into Friends: How the United States Can Court Its Adversaries” Foreign Affairs 89(2010): 121.

¹³³ Claudia Koonz, The Nazi Conscience. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 3.

¹³⁴ John Vasquez, Ed. What Do We Know About War?, p. 308; Manus I. Midlarsky, Ed. Handbook of War Studies II. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000.

¹³⁵ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go To War. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005, p. 13.

¹³⁶ Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2000, p. 29.

¹³⁷ Ibid. p.29.

¹³⁸ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War.” International Security 20(1995): 5-25.

¹³⁹ Ibid., pp. 6, 8.

¹⁴⁰ Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 19, 198; Hilde Ravlo et al, “Colonial War and the Democratic Peace.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 47(2003): 521.

¹⁴¹ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight, p. 28.

¹⁴² Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, p. ix.

¹⁴³ Ibid, p. 2.

¹⁴⁴ Suzanne Desan, The Family on Trial in Revolutionary France. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004; Eli Sagan, Citizens & Cannibals, p. 106; Lloyd deMause, The Emotional Life of Nations, p. 424-426.

¹⁴⁵ Elisabeth Badinter, Mother Love: Myth and Reality, p. 27.

¹⁴⁶ Tom Nairn, Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited. London: Verso, p. 3.

¹⁴⁷ Joan B. Landes, Visualizing the Nation: Gender, Representation, and Revolution in Eighteenth-Century France. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001, p. 140.

¹⁴⁸ Lynn Hunt, The Family Romance of the French Revolution. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, p. 99.

¹⁴⁹ Eli Sagan, Citizens and Cannibals, p. 112.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 349.

¹⁵¹ Richard Cobb, Voices of the French Revolution. Topsfield: Salem House Publishers, 1988, p. 158.

¹⁵² H. M. van Praag, et al, Eds. Violence and Suicidality: Perspectives in Clinical and Psychobiological Research. New York: Bruner/Mazel, 1990, pp. 218-241.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 330.

¹⁵⁴ Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 207.

¹⁵⁵ Adam Zamoyski, Holy Madness: Romantics, Patriots and Revolutionaries—1776-1871. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999, p. 78.

¹⁵⁶ Ivan Sternski, Contesting Sacrifice: Religion, Nationalism, and Social Thought in France. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002, p. 37

¹⁵⁷ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing To Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go To War. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005, p. 179.

¹⁵⁸ Gwyne Dyer, War: The Lethal Custom. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2004, p. 23.

¹⁵⁹ Eli Sagan, Citizens & Cannibals, p. 476.

¹⁶⁰ Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989, p. 791.

¹⁶¹ David A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2007, p. 251.

¹⁶² Jim Powell, Wilson’s War. New York: Crown Forum, 2005, p. 21.

¹⁶³ Gwynne Dyer, War: The Lethal Custom, p. 231.